Safeguarding the Future: How one biosecurity Game Changer is building a safer bioeconomy in Africa

Through a pioneering fellowship with Brown’s Pandemic Center, genomic epidemiologist Edyth Parker is working to prevent man-made biological threats and foster responsible innovation by mapping DNA synthesis practices and helping to shape biosecurity policies across Africa.

Safeguarding communities, the nation and the world from biological threats, like infectious disease outbreaks and the weaponization of biological technologies, is a cornerstone mission of the Pandemic Center at the Brown University School of Public Health.

To help address these threats, the Pandemic Center launched the Biosecurity Game Changers international fellowship program this year. Its inaugural cohort includes eight scientists committed to preventing and preparing for high-stakes global health security challenges. The year-long fellowship began in September with a policymaking workshop in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Genomic Epidemiologist Edyth Parker is among the first cohort of Game Changer Fellows. 

Over the past year, Parker has been embedded with the International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science (IBBIS)an NGO focused on advancing responsible protections in bio-innovation. 

Her central project is the Global DNA Synthesis Screening Map, a database of DNA synthesis providers, their screening practices and the relevant national regulations around DNA synthesis and transfer. A goal of the project is to prevent deliberate and accidental biological emergencies while helping to enable African bioeconomies–which use renewable biological resources and technologies such as gene editing–to flourish safely. 

To date, Parker has interviewed over 40 scientists, company leaders and regulators across 15 African countries and conducted extensive open-source research. Her team has presented her findings at the UN’s Biological Weapons Convention and SynBio Africa.

Parker is also developing policy workshops focused on securing Africa’s growing bioeconomy. These sessions—which will include regulators, industry leaders and officials from organizations such as Africa CDC, and the Council for Scientific and Industry Research Biofoundry—will focus on integrating safety measures like DNA screening into bioeconomic development plans.

Parker, who earned her doctorate from the University of Cambridge, studies how diseases evolve over time and spread through populations and geographies. Her approach helps us understand the origins of outbreaks, how viruses spread across borders, the hosts they may have jumped from and whether their evolving traits make them more dangerous or transmissible. She currently works at the Institute for Genomics and Global Health.

We spoke with Parker about her work at Brown as a Biosecurity Game Changer.

Tell us a bit about what you’re working on for the Pandemic Center. 

I’m hosted by IBBIS, the International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science, whose mission is really about enabling science and bio-economies to flourish, while ensuring that innovation happens responsibly, especially when it comes to dual-use research and emerging technologies.

The core of IBBIS’s current portfolio is DNA synthesis screening. Synthetic DNA is foundational across biotech, used in everything from diagnostics to agricultural tech. As it becomes easier and cheaper to synthesize DNA, access widens, which is great for science. But it also lowers the barriers for malicious actors to acquire the components needed to engineer biological threats.

IBBIS focuses on safeguarding the “digital-physical” interface—essentially, the systems that translate digital DNA designs into physical molecules. That’s a key leverage point, especially given how hard it is to regulate the rapidly evolving AI landscape. One practical way to reduce risk is by implementing robust screening processes at DNA synthesis companies.

IBBIS advocates for two key safeguards: customer screening (verifying buyers are legitimate scientists or companies) and sequence screening (checking the DNA being ordered doesn’t include parts of dangerous pathogens). This helps detect and deter misuse before anything is synthesized. It’s a growing area of work, but IBBIS is very much leading on this front.

“ As it becomes easier and cheaper to synthesize DNA, access widens, which is great for science. But it also lowers the barriers for malicious actors to acquire the components needed to engineer biological threats. ”

Dr. Edyth Parker genomic epidemiologist and Biosecurity Game Changer Fellow

Could you share more about the DNA synthesis screening project you’re leading, particularly what you’ve learned across African nations?

One of the projects I’ve been leading this year is the Global DNA Synthesis Screening Map. It’s essentially a global database of DNA synthesis providers, their screening practices and the relevant national regulations around DNA synthesis and transfer.

There’s a common, but largely unverified, claim that 80% of synthetic DNA comes from companies that screen orders. But the origins of that statistic are unclear, and we really don’t have comprehensive visibility into what’s happening globally.

In mapping this out, I’ve focused on the African region. One of the biggest surprises has been just how uneven and inconsistent screening practices are—not just across Africa, but globally. In Africa, South Africa dominates the synthesis market, but overall, local synthesis capacity is still limited. Most synthetic DNA is imported, and benchtop synthesizers, which can be higher risk, are essentially nonexistent.

Still, synthetic biology is growing fast on the continent, which is exciting. New biofoundries, startups, and initiatives like those from the Africa CDC are accelerating innovation. But regulatory frameworks haven’t kept pace. Many researchers report little to no customer or sequence screening from the providers they use, largely because few African countries have clear regulations around DNA synthesis.

This isn’t a uniquely African issue. Globally, there’s a need for harmonized, risk-based standards. But there’s also a unique opportunity here for African leadership to shape regionally appropriate, forward-looking screening frameworks grounded in local context.

Your policy workshops seek to integrate biosecurity into Africa’s growing bioeconomy. How do you balance innovation and regulation in that process?

That’s a great question—and a critical balance to strike. One of the main lessons I’ve learned, especially through my Game Changers fellowship at IBBIS and the broader network (including partners like CEPI), is that biosecurity and innovation are not in opposition. They’re mutually reinforcing.

Our policy workshops emphasize that safeguards should be seen not as restrictions, but as enablers of resilient, responsible science. Especially as an African scientist, I’ve seen the harm of trying to import “one-size-fits-all” frameworks. So we’re focused on co-developing context-specific policies that are practical, proportional and aligned with real-world innovation pathways.

We work directly with scientists, industry leaders, regulators, and regional institutions to ensure that safeguards are integrated from the start, not as an afterthought. And that they are designed to support, not stifle, the momentum of Africa’s bioeconomy. For example, you don’t want policies that create paperwork bottlenecks during a pandemic, when quick access to diagnostics is crucial. It’s all about embedding safeguards in a way that enables agile and safe response.

“ Safeguards should be seen not as restrictions, but as enablers of resilient, responsible science. Especially as an African scientist, I’ve seen the harm of trying to import “one-size-fits-all” frameworks. ”

Edyth Parker Pandemic Center Biosecurity Fellow

What kinds of structural or cultural shifts are needed for African research voices to be fully recognized and supported in global pandemic preparedness?

This really goes beyond biosafety. At every level—policy, institutional, cultural—we need structural change. Globally, funding and governance systems need to move past tokenism and ensure that African scientists are not just implementers, but agenda-setters with real decision-making power.

Sustained investment in Africa-led research is essential. And that means core institutional funding, not just short-term project grants, which are incredibly vulnerable to political and economic shifts as we saw this year with USAID cuts that devastated some South African research programs.

We also need to strengthen intra-African networks. The Africa CDC has done remarkable work in this area, especially with the Pathogen Genomics Initiative. But we need deeper investments in long-term infrastructure, data sovereignty, leadership development and South-South collaborations that build a durable ecosystem from within the continent.

Culturally, the global health community must move away from a crisis-driven, neocolonial model of engagement. African scientists are not just “sample collectors;” we bring essential local knowledge, lived experience and scientific excellence. That needs to be recognized and treated as equal footing expertise, not an afterthought.

Have you been based in South Africa during the fellowship?

Yes I’ve been fully remote, based in South Africa. What’s really exciting about this fellowship is that it’s operational. It’s the first of its kind where fellows are embedded 50% of the time in a host institution. I’m embedded at IBBIS, others are with the Brown Pandemic Center, CEPI, GAVI, and the Biological Weapons Convention. We’re not doing short-term internships or purely academic research; we’re fully embedded in real teams doing real operational work. It’s a model that allows people like me, and other fellows who hold leadership roles in government or academia, to stay in our roles while gaining hands-on experience in pandemic preparedness.

Personally, I’ve found it incredibly valuable to be part of a growing organization like IBBIS and to witness, firsthand, what it takes to build legitimacy, trust and a global presence from the ground up.

The Pandemic Center’s Biosecurity Game Changers Fellowship is unlike any other program out there. It’s not an internship, and it’s not a detached academic opportunity. It’s a sustained, embedded experience that offers access, responsibility, and co-learning at an incredibly high level.

What makes it special is the network of host organizations are all deeply committed to developing talent across Africa and beyond. And the fellows themselves are extraordinary. It’s been deeply enriching to work alongside such visionary peers, and the collective learning has been one of the most rewarding parts of the experience.

This model should be scaled. Funders and institutions need to understand its potential—because it’s not just building individual capacity, it’s building a durable, networked, and highly collaborative ecosystem for global health security.